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Abstract 
 
Teamwork in the automotive industry varies significantly from plant 
to plant. This article compares teamwork in four automobile plants 
in Germany and Britain, and addresses two questions: (1) Do dif-
ferent models of teamwork fit into a bi-polar model of teamwork, 
being either innovative or structural conservative? (2) Do current 
models of teamwork signify a development towards post-fordism, or 
are they merely part of a neo-fordist rationalisation of production?  
  The following answers are suggested: (1) Teamwork in differ-
ent motor-car plants cannot be categorised in a bi-polar model; 
rather do they represent a continuum. (2) Teamwork moves manu-
facturing away from traditional taylorist models of production, but 
does not over-come Taylorism altogether. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Already in the late 1960s and early 70s, teamwork was important in 
manufacturing. During this period, the aim of teamwork was to im-
prove working conditions. In West Germany, teamwork was sup-
ported by the HdA programme, a quality of working life programme 
by the Brandt-government (Auer 1988: iv). During the 1980s, team-
work became important again with the spread of new production 
concepts in the German manufacturing industry (Kern/Schumann 
1984). Teamwork was meant to facilitate a more intense utilisation 
of labour. 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, teamwork has experienced another 
revival. In opposition to the 1970s and 1980s, it now is about two 
ends, improvement of working conditions and rationalisation, how-
ever the latter is clearly dominating (Gerst et. al. 1994: 5).   
One major cause for this revival of teamwork was the MIT-study on 
the Japanese motor-car industry (Womack et al. 1990). The authors 
explained the world-wide success of the Japanese motor-car indus-
try with what they called lean production, which bases on organisa-
tional efficiency and an intense utilisation of labour. One central 
component of lean production is teamwork. 
The motor-car industry played a key role in the ‘sudden boom of 
teamwork‘ (Endres/Wehner 1993). In Germany, all major motor-car 
companies implemented teamwork in the early 1990s (Roth 1996a). 
In Britain, too, most major car manufacturers adopted lean produc-
tion methods, including teamwork, in the 1990, following the estab-
lishment of Japanese car plants (where work practices are based on 
lean production) in the UK (IRS 1993: 5, FT 01/09/1995). 
The models of teamwork in different car factories vary considerably, 
and so do the judgements about them. Teamwork is described as ei-
ther post- or neo-fordist, innovative or conservative, work enhanc-
ing or work controlling (cf. below). This variety of teamwork pro-
vides the starting point for this article, which compares teamwork in 
two German and two British car plants. 154  European Political Economy Review  
 
 
The following section introduces the two research questions – 
whether teamwork in different car factories can be categorised into 
a bi-polar model of teamwork, and whether the introduction of 
teamwork brings about a development towards post-fordism. The 
third section reviews the literature on teamwork in the automobile 
industry, and introduces two opposite models of teamwork. The 
fourth section contains four case studies, which are compared and 
evaluated the following two sections. The seventh section concludes. 
 
2. Research  Questions 
 
The development of teamwork in the automotive industry since the 
mid-1990s seems to be characterised by a ‘struggle of two lines’ 
(Roth 1996b), which represent two contrary ‘conceptual poles’ 
(Kuhlmann 1996: 114) of teamwork.  
Various German authors have attempted to conceptualise this. An-
toni (1994) confronts ‘partly autonomous teams’ with ‘production 
teams’, Roth (1996b) talks about self-organised and taylorised 
teamwork, while Gerst et al. (1995) contrast innovative teamwork 
with structural conservative teamwork. Similar approaches to divide 
different models of teamwork into two opposite groups, such as 
‘ work enhancing’ or ‘work controlling’, have been made by British 
authors (cf. Babson 1995, Bacon/Storey 1995, Wadding-
ton/Whitston 1996). However, there is no research that examines 
whether these bipolar models are applicable across countries. 
The first question is: Can teamwork in different plants be classified 
using a bi-polar model of teamwork, as conceptualised by these au-
thors?  
The second question regards the consequences of the introduction 
of teamwork, which has brought about substantial changes in the 
organisation of production.  
There is wide disagreement about the extent and quality of these 
changes as well as about their consequences. Influential conceptu-
alisations describe them as either neo- or post-Fordist, i.e. as either 
a renewal or a transcendence of Taylorism (Lane 1995: 146). Wergin: Teamwork in the Automobile Industry 155 
The proponents of the post-fordism thesis, such as Piore and Sabel 
(1984) predict that these changes would entail a move away from 
the taylorist division of labour, and lead to increased skills and 
autonomy for workers. Kern and Schumann (1984) share this opti-
mism, predicting ‘the end of the division of labour’
1. 
In contrast, members of the French école de régulation (e.g. Coriat 
1980) are very critical of the developments including the introduc-
tion of teamwork. They interpret them as a renewal rather than a 
transcendence of Fordism that leads to an intensification of work 
and managerial control, rather than creating better working condi-
tions and empowering workers. Thus, they talk of neo-fordism 
rather than post-fordism. 
The more recent industrial relations literature has dealt with these is-
sues, too. Again, there are two sides. The optimists argue that new 
productions concepts, of which teamwork is a central element, em-
power workers and create a better and more stimulating work envi-
ronment. Walton (1985) postulated a shift from a ‘Management of 
Control’ to a  ‘Management of Commitment’, which implies ‘a pro-
gressive withdrawal of managerial control in favour of employee 
autonomy’ (Gallie et al. 1998: 57). 
The ‘simplistic and unitarist biases of these accounts’ 
(Geary/Dubbins 2001: 4) have been criticised widely (cf. ibid.). Ba-
sically, the criticism is similar to that by the Regulation School. 
Hyman and Mason (1995: 191), for example, argue that ‘empow-
erment becomes a euphemism for work intensification’.  
The second question is: Does teamwork in the automobile industry 
overcome the taylorist division of labour and bring about the intro-
duction of post-fordist modes of production, or is it merely part of a 
neo-fordist rationalisation of production according to the principles 
of Fordism, renewing it rather than transcending it? 
Both questions are, while dealing with different issues, closely 
linked. The two polar models of teamwork (to which question one 
relates, and which will be elaborated upon in the following section) 
                                                 
1   This is the title of their book. Yet, it should be noted that it is followed by a ques-
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correspond to ‘post-fordist teamwork’ and ‘neo-fordist teamwork’. 
 
3.  Teamwork in the Automobile Industry –  
  Theory and Literature 
 
According to Shaw’s definition (1981: 8),  
‘a group is defined as two or more persons who are interacting with one 
another in such a manner that each person influences and is influenced by 
each other person.’ 
Furthermore, teams
2, as opposed to aggregates of people,  
‘(1) endure for a reasonable period (…), (2) have a common goal or goals, 
and (3) have developed at least a rudimentary group structure’ (ibid.). 
In line with that, Katzenbach/Smith (1993: 45) define a team as: 
‘a small number of people with complimentary skills who are committed 
to a common purpose, performance goals, and approach for which they 
hold themselves mutually accountable.’  
These definitions refer to small groups of people, as interaction and 
mutual accountability are less likely in large groups. Rosenstiel 
(1978: 40) furthermore stresses the necessity of a ‘we-feeling’, i.e. 
the existence of group cohesion, in order to call an aggregate of 
people a team. The cohesion of a group of people is influenced by 
their interdependence, based on the division of labour and their 
emotional relations (ibid.). 
There are different forms of teamwork. On the one hand, there are 
so-called off-line teams that meet only from time to time, such as 
proposition groups and quality circles. On the other hand, there are 
permanent teams that are part of the regular organisation of work. 
This article is about the latter form of teamwork. 
There are different models of teamwork of the latter type. It has 
been suggested that two opposing models of teamwork are evolving, 
as stated earlier. Antoni (1994) distinguishes ‘partly autonomous 
teams’ from ‘production teams’, Roth (1996b) talks about self-
organised and taylorised teamwork, while Gerst et al. (1995) con-
trast ‘innovative teamwork’ with ‘structural conservative teamwork’.  
                                                 
2   The terms ‘group’ and ‘team’ are used interchangeably here. Wergin: Teamwork in the Automobile Industry 157 
These concepts are presented below. While the above-mentioned 
authors use different terms, their concepts are compatible. I there-
fore summarise partly autonomous teams, self-organised and inno-
vative teamwork on the one hand, and production teams, taylorised, 
and structural conservative teamwork on the other.  
 
Figure 1: Organisation of Tasks and Responsibilities in SATs 
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3.1  Innovative Teamwork: Semi-Autonomous Teams 
 
The concept of socio-technical teamwork with semi autonomous 
teams (SAT) became popular through the experiments of the Swed-158  European Political Economy Review  
 
 
ish companies Saab and Volvo, and by projects that were part of the 
German HdA programme (cf. introduction) (Berggren 1991). SATs 
are used to overcome traditional structures of work. 
 
The crucial feature of SATs is that they produce complete compo-
nents such as engines largely self-organised and self-dependent. 
SATs carry out a considerably extended range of tasks (compared to 
workers on the assembly line) and assume considerable discretion 
for the organisation and conduct of their work, independent of supe-
riors. Besides an extension of direct productive tasks, indirect pro-
duction and planning tasks are transferred to the team, such as holi-
day scheduling, maintenance of machines, and the micro-regulation 
of the production process (cf. figure 1) (Gerst et. al. 1995). 
As a means of self-regulation, team meetings take place on a more 
or less regular basis. In these meetings, work is co-ordinated and 
planned, and internal problems are discussed. Furthermore, the team 
elects a team speaker who represents the team, but is no superior. 
One important element of SATs is a decentralisation of the func-
tions of specialists (Antoni 1994: 35ff). The concept of the SAT 
comprises accordingly job enrichment (or ‘vertical integration of 
tasks’), i.e. the integration of indirect production and planning tasks 
and functions (or secondary tasks) into the area of responsibility of 
the team, as well as job enlargement (or ‘horizontal extension of 
tasks’), i.e. an extension of direct production tasks (or primary 
tasks) performed by each worker (ibid.: 26ff) (cf. figure three). Job 
enlargement is normally achieved by job rotation
3. Thus, SATs are 
characterised by a quantitative and qualitative extension of tasks.  
 
3.2  Structural Conservative Teamwork: Taylorised Assembly 
Teams 
 
Assembly teams are fundamentally different from SATs. Here, the 
                                                 
3   However, job rotation is not necessarily confined to direct production tasks, it 
can also include indirect production and planning tasks, cf. the case study on 
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assembly line
4 remains central. This results in a technical depend-
ence of the workstations, which is even raised by the removal of 
buffers for material in the course of just-in-time manufacturing. The 
taylorist division of labour with short (as a rule, less than two min-
utes), cycle-bound and standardised tasks, too, remains unchanged. 
The extension of tasks is subordinated to this principle. 
 
Figure 2: Integration of Tasks and Functions in Teams 
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In opposition to manufacturing on the traditional assembly line, the 
personnel on the line are subdivided into teams. It is expected, as a 
rule, that each employee be acquainted with at least three stations 
from within its section of the line. This makes possible a limited job 
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rotation, and thus a high flexibility in the deployment of personnel. 
The integration of indirect tasks is limited (Antoni 1994: 42f). 
The self-organisation of these teams, too, remains restricted to few 
areas. The prerequisites for this, such as own scope to act and de-
cide, team meetings or possibilities to gain additional qualifications 
are normally absent.  
Team leaders appointed by the management head teams. They con-
trol and evaluate their team and assign work to team members. Con-
sequently, they take over the role of a superior or foreman, in oppo-
sition to elected team speakers, who are primus inter pares. 
 Planning and execution of work are still largely divided. Separate 
departments or superiors are still in charge of all aspects of person-
nel/HRM, general management, production management, Engineer-
ing, logistics and often maintenance. Only parts of quality manage-
ment, job planning and, sometimes, maintenance are transferred to 
the teams (Gerst et. al. 1995, Roth 1996b). 
 Thus, 
‘(t)he reality of work for the employees remains, as before, characterised 
by precise instructions, low requirements and a largely disciplining 
framework. (…) The conditions of work do not differ from traditional mo-
tor-car plants in most respects; the stress lies mainly on a high workload’ 
(Gerst et. al. 1995: 42f).  
 
 
4. Case  Studies 
 
This article is based on four case studies in two British and two 
German automobile plants. A comparison of teamwork in Britain 
and Germany is interesting as Britain and Germany are prototypes 
of different production models, the Anglo-Saxon model on the one 
hand, the Rhineland model on the other. While Germany is a highly 
regulated high-wage economy, the British economy is identified 
with its supposed flexibility and its ability to compete on the basis 
of low labour cost.  Wergin: Teamwork in the Automobile Industry 161 
The four studied plants are Nissan Sunderland and Vauxhall Luton 
in Britain and Opel Eisenach and Mercedes-Benz A-City
5 in Ger-
many. Two of the plants, Luton and Eisenach, are owned by the 
same corporation, General Motors (GM). Therefore, sample allows 
comparing teamwork within countries as well as within one corpo-
ration across countries
6. 
In the following four sections, teamwork in the four mentioned 
plants will be described by looking at the tasks of the teams, the or-
ganisation of work within teams, and the role of team leaders.  
The case studies draw on various unpublished materials
7 and 23 in-
terviews. 
 
4.1  Opel Eisenach  
Opel’s Eisenach plant is located in Thuringia in East Germany. It 
opened in 1992 and currently employs about 2,000 people. Eisenach 
is Opel’s first plant that is organised completely according to the 
principles of lean production. However, Japanese production meth-
ods were adapted to German circumstances. 
Opel was the first company to emulate Japanese manufacturing 
methods without a Japanese joint-venture partner. Opel could, how-
ever, draw on experiences from other GM plants. Eisenach thus 
represents the case of a ‘transplant’ modelled after the Japanese 
concepts of ‘lean production’, but set up by a western company 
(Enderle 1994, Shaiken et al. 1997, Jürgens 1998: 326ff, Reitz 
1999: 133). 
The plant is highly productive. Eisenach was identified as most 
productive car plant in Europe in 1995 (EIU 1995).  In 2002, Eisen-
ach was still fifth most productive plant in Europe (Financial Times, 
07/08/2002). 
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the author with the condition not to reveal the name of the plant. 
6   Because of the small number of cases, the results remain tentative. 
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The Eisenach plant started from the beginning with teams as the ba-
sic work units (Lieske 1993). As the Eisenach plant is a greenfield 
site, Opel could implement a working organisation of its choice 
without the need to consult a works council.  
Recruitment for Eisenach was highly selective. Opel hand-picked 
out of a huge reservoir of skilled car workers. As a result, all of the 
line workers are Facharbeiter (skilled workers) (Jürgens 1998: 332). 
 
The Teams  
The average size of teams is 4.65 members. Within the teams, every 
employee is expected to master all tasks. Next to direct production 
tasks, teams are responsible for material supply, holiday scheduling, 
selection of new team members, and occasionally for dealing with 
external customers and suppliers (Gerst 1995a: 4, Opel 1999a: 7). 
Besides material supply, teams have very few responsibilities for 
indirect production tasks, as there are specialised teams for mainte-
nance and quality assurance. Teams carry out only minor mainte-
nance and quality control. Per work cycle (currently around 100 
sec), team members have about three to six seconds to check the 
quality of their work. 
An important task of teams in Eisenach is the participation in Kai-
zen, the continuing improvement process, by making improvement 
suggestions. Team members are requested to ‘strive for improve-
ments in cost, quality, productivity etc’ (Opel 1999a: 5). The most 
important task in this respect is the reduction of times for the stan-
dard operation procedures. Management tries to provoke this by 
constantly reducing cycle times (Gerst 1995a: 6), a method called 
‘management by stress’ (Parker/Slaughter 1988). The suggestion 
system is quite successful in Eisenach: Workers currently make 
about 20 suggestions per annum on average. 
In theory, workers have to stick to the standard operation sheets 
(Opel 1999a: 5), but in practice, this is not supervised, and workers 
deviate from the standard operation procedures.  Wergin: Teamwork in the Automobile Industry 163 
Teams are allowed to refuse production targets if they think that 
these are out of reach, however this does not happen in practice  
(ibid.). 
Jobs are rotated on a regular basis for training and ergonomic rea-
sons (Jürgens 1998: 331). Teams determine jointly and independ-
ently how to rotate jobs, which may be weekly, daily or after each 
break (Buleweg 1995: 27). According to the works council chair-
man, job rotation strengthens solidarity and brings about an equal 
distribution of strain between the members of the team. 
Team meetings have tailed off in recent years. There are obligatory 
monthly meetings that last about one hour. They are outside regular 
working hours and paid as overtime. The meetings are about the or-
ganisation of work as well as quality issues, improvement sugges-
tions etc. Topics are not given by management (ibid.). 
 
The Team Leaders 
Team leaders in Eisenach assume a broad range of responsibilities. 
They cover for absentees, co-ordinate and allocate work, organise 
team meetings, train team members, perform most personnel func-
tions besides holiday scheduling, and assure that the team fulfils the 
performance standards (Gottschall 1994: 246, Opel 1999a: 6ff).  
Furthermore, they evaluate and forward improvement suggestions 
made by members of their team, carry out time measurements, and 
administer the standard operation sheets and Kanban-cards, i.e. se-
cure material supply, check the quality of the supplied material, and 
supervise the production process (Gerst 1995a: 4, Mickler et al. 
1996: 117, Jürgens 1998: 331). 
Thus, the team leader could be described as a ‘revalued foreman’, 
Gerst (1995a: 5) concludes. The works council chairman agrees 
with this assessment (interview notes). However, team leaders in 
Eisenach have no disciplinary functions and no authority to instruct. 
These functions are performed by so-called ‘area engineers’. Thus, 
team leaders are no superiors; they are ‘organisers’ (ibid.) and ‘co-
ordinators’ (Buleweg 1995: 27). 164  European Political Economy Review  
 
 
Team leaders are appointed by management on suggestions of 
foremen and the works council (Köhler 1993: 12). They are paid 20 
per cent more than normal employees.  
In a survey in 1996 years ago, 88 per cent of team members indi-
cated that they were dissatisfied with their team leaders (Opel 1996), 
but in a more recent survey (Opel 1999b), team members assessed 
their leaders ‘surprisingly positive’ (interview notes). The most 
likely reason for this is a change in the team leader’s understanding 
of their role, i.e. that team leaders behave less like a superior and 
more like primus inter pares.  
 
4.2 Mercedes-Benz’  A-City Plant 
The Mercedes-Benz plant in A-City, founded at the end of the nine-
teenth century, produces Engines and engine components. The plant 
has continuously been extended, is highly mechanised and currently 
employs 2,700 people. 
Before teamwork was introduced, production jobs had been limited 
to operating individual machines, i.e. tasks were basically confined 
to machine tending and handling parts. These jobs were highly re-
petitive, and employees were exposed to considerable physical 
strain.  
A company-wide agreement (Mercedes-Benz 1995) between Mer-
cedes-Benz and the company-wide works council was the basis for 
the introduction of teamwork. According to this agreement, a joint 
steering committee was established ‘to co-ordinate the introduction 
of teamwork and to further develop it’ (ibid.: 246, own translat.). 
Furthermore, workers were involved in the design of their new 
work areas (Gerst et al. 1995: 376f). The previous workforce was 
taken over completely. 
The Teams  
Teams in A-City consist of 13 members, including the team speaker. 
The company agreement on teamwork states that ‘Holistic job de-
signs are to be introduced by means of integrating direct, indirect Wergin: Teamwork in the Automobile Industry 165 
and planning tasks and functions’ (Mercedes-Benz 1995: 242, own 
translat.). This has been realised: There are no more dedicated per-
sonnel for machine setting and manning and quality control – these 
functions are now carried out by the teams – and there are only few 
maintenance staff left for major breakdowns. Teams conduct most 
maintenance tasks too – not just minor maintenance.  
In addition to ten workstations on machines per team that are cycle-
bound, the comprehensive integration of indirect and related func-
tions led to the creation of three additional, non-repetitive jobs per 
team where most indirect tasks – which were formerly carried out 
by specialists – are concentrated. These are rotated routinely among 
team members (Kuhlmann 1996: 126). 
In addition to indirect production tasks, teams have collectively 
taken over responsibility for most planning functions. Teams now 
administer their shift and holiday timetables independently, and or-
ganise the production programme and the sequence of orders to be 
fulfilled independently. 
Within the team, all tasks and functions are rotated routinely, in-
cluding the three jobs that are not cycle-bound. Team members ad-
minister the rotation independently (Gerst et al. 1995: 376ff, Kempe 
2000: 20). 
According to the company agreement, ‘A time of about thirty min-
utes per week is guaranteed for team meetings’ (Mercedes-Benz 
1995: 245, own translat.). These are led by the team speaker. Man-
agement does not prescribe the content of the meetings. 
 
The Team Speakers 
The team speaker in A-City is fully integrated into the production 
process and has hardly any additional responsibilities compared to 
‘normal’ team members. Their only additional responsibilities are 
preparation and leadership of team meetings, and the representation 
of the team. Team speakers hold no hierarchical position and posses 
no disciplinary or supervisory functions and have no authority to in-
struct. 166  European Political Economy Review  
 
 
All indirect and planning tasks were devolved to the team as a 
whole. Thus, decisions are made by the entire team, not just the 
speaker. Gerst et al. (1994: 12, own translat.) found that ‘The team 
interprets their area of responsibility explicitly as a common task’. 
The team speaker is elected by his team (Mercedes-Benz 1995: 244) 
and does not receive any additional compensation.  
 
4.3  Nissan Sunderland  
Nissan’s Sunderland plant in Tyne and Wear opened in 1986. Nis-
san started from scratch on a greenfield site, with no traditions of 
trade unions organisation or established shop-floor custom and 
practice. Nissan thus has been able to experiment with a model of 
its choice from the beginning (Oliver/Wilkinson 1992: 214). All 
workers have been organised in teams from the very beginning on. 
Sunderland is a comparatively large plant: it employs around 5,000 
and produces three passenger car ranges. In 1999, Nissan
8 became 
Britain’s biggest carmaker. The plant was the first so-called Japa-
nese ‘transplant’ in the UK. It became the benchmark among Euro-
pean manufacturers and was an important catalyst for the diffusion 
of Japanese production methods in Europe (Jürgens 1998: 323). 
For the last six years, Sunderland has led the productivity tables for 
European car plants (Financial Times, 07/08/2002, EIU 1997-2002). 
 
The Teams  
All approximately 5,000 employees working on the assembly line 
are organised in teams. Each team consists of eight to 17 workers; 
the average size is about ten. 
Within each team, workers are responsible for basic maintenance, 
sub-assembly tasks, and quality assurance for their own work. 
However, there are special personnel for maintenance and quality 
assurance. Team members do not assume responsibility for these 
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tasks completely. There is one so-called check-and-repair-person 
for each two teams who checks the quality of tasks performed by 
these two teams and repairs faults. Similarly, there is still dedicated 
staff for maintenance. Yet, in opposition to the traditional taylorist 
plant, team members are expected to assist maintenance personnel 
when they come along. 
Workers’ autonomy in Sunderland is very restricted. According to 
the AEEU regional officer responsible for Sunderland, work at 
Sunderland is ‘dictated’ (interview notes). Corresponding with that, 
a member of NMUK’s company council stated that team members 
can make ‘no decisions at all’ (ibid.). 
Even the possibility to make changes to their work routines inde-
pendently does not exist, as supervisors do not allow even the 
slightest deviation from the ‘standard operation routines’
9, and 
changes in the standard operation procedures must first be cleared 
by several superiors before they can be implemented. Several work-
ers reported that in many instances, even though they could provide 
better solutions, these were frequently ignored or deferred. 
Workers are expected to master different tasks from their team’s 
section, but not all. The team’s supervisor assures that each team 
member is able to cover three jobs, and that each job is to be cov-
ered by three people. Nissan thinks that ‘this formula will allow 
enough flexibility so that all jobs can be covered at all times’ (Gar-
rahan/Stewart 1992: 84). Therefore, a complete rotation (of all men 
through all jobs) is not possible. In fact, jobs are not changed much 
at all. One employee said: ‘On-line I would say I move around 
pretty rarely. On-line you are given a specific job and it is very rare 
you will change from this job unless somebody is absent’ (quoted in 
ibid.: 83). 
There are daily team meetings at the beginning of each shift that last 
about five minutes. Discussions do not usually take place in these 
meetings; they are to give information to team members merely. 
What Nissan calls ‘consultative decision making’ (Wickens 1985: 
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19ff) (in the meetings) is in fact a process of managers and team 
leaders ‘informing and imposing the pre-ordained “right” answer’ 
(Garrahan/Stewart 1992: 96ff). 
 
The Team Leaders  
The team leader has not many tasks; he is merely responsible for 
training and development in his team, for leading the daily team 
meetings, and for few planning functions. He works on-line regu-
larly with his team members. He has no disciplinary functions and 
no authority to instruct. 
The supervisor, on the other hand, is responsible for basically eve-
rything that happens in his zone (Wickens 1985: 21), he is ‘like a 
managing director’ (interview notes) for his zone, which comprises 
two teams, and ‘holds together everything’ (ibid.). He is responsible 
for finance, personnel, efficiency, quality and Kaizen, and has dis-
ciplinary functions, among other functions.  
 
4.4  Vauxhall Luton  
The Vauxhall Luton plant in Bedfordshire near London was built in 
1902. Substantial investments were made to upgrade it in the 1990s. 
The plant closed down
10 in 2001, by which time it employed about 
2,000 people. 
The investments in the 1990s led to plant-wide changes focusing on 
the implementation of lean production techniques, including team-
work. Negotiations on the introduction of teamwork began in 1990. 
Initially, unions were suspicious of teamworking
11 . However, 
teamwork had already been introduced in Vauxhall’s Ellesmere Port 
plant, and there was consensus that it wouldn’t be possible to reject 
teamwork altogether. Therefore, unions – in particular the TGWU – 
                                                 
10  This happened shortly after interviews were carried out. Still, I am using the 
present tense in this case study. 
11  Unions feared that teamwork would lead to job losses and poorer and harder 
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chose to ‘engage and change’ rather than to oppose teamwork alto-
gether.  
As the strategy of Vauxhall’s management was to get union consent 
in all stages in order to avoid damaging confrontations, unions got 
some concessions from management. In the final agreement, both 
sides achieved their objectives (Stewart 1997: 5). It states, among 
other things, that the role of union representatives would be pre-
served and that team leaders have no role in discipline and griev-
ance cases (Carr 1994: 201ff, Murakami 1998: 802). 
A ballot of union members in August 1992 accepted the agreement. 
The previous workforce was taken over completely. 
 
The Teams 
Teams in Luton may consist of five to 15 people according to the 
plant agreement. However, as there have been problems to manage 
large teams, the maximum size of teams was, in fact, seven, while 
the average size at the time of the interviews was 6.3.  
Teams members take over responsibilities for minor maintenance 
and self-inspection ‘subject to time allowance’ (Vauxhall 1992: 19) 
and are requested to ensure that the required quality standards are 
met and to rectify defective parts, wherever possible. However, 
there is still dedicated staff for maintenance and quality assurance 
as well as material handling (Vauxhall 1992: 19ff, Vauxhall 1996).  
Furthermore, team members are expected to participate in Kaizen 
by doing their own time and motion studies, by helping to control 
scrap, and by looking for improvements in the design of the product 
and the safety of the work area (ibid.). That is ‘as far as it goes’ (in-
terview notes); other tasks are not devolved to team members. 
At the time of the interviews, workers in Luton made just two im-
provement suggestions on average per year. If workers have ideas 
to improve the work process or the product, they usually talk about 
this with their fellow team members initially. If the intended 
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Then, a formal improvement suggestion is filled out, usually by the 
whole team collectively. Depending on the level of the change, the 
team leader, supervisor, shift manager or unit manager, who may 
consult engineers when necessary, decides whether to adopt the 
suggestion or not.  
As in other plants, Standard Operation Sheets exist in Luton, but 
their compliance is not supervised, and in practice, workers deviate 
from them. 
Jobs are rotated within the team, and where necessary, also between 
teams within job classifications (Murakami 1998: 801). Job rotation 
takes place on a regular, scheduled base. Teams decide independ-
ently on how to rotate jobs. While it is officially the team leader’s 
responsibility to organise and plan job rotation, the team usually 
agrees jointly on how to rotate. Jobs may be rotated weekly, daily or 
twice daily, for example. As team members are expected to master 
all jobs from their team’s section, a ‘complete rotation’
12 is possible. 
Team-meetings take place as the need arises. They are rather short 
and informal. Often, meetings are hold in breaks, which last 25 
minutes
13.  Form and contents of team meetings are subject to joint 
regulation according to the plant agreement (Vauxhall 1992). 
Meetings may be about work scheduling or improvement sugges-
tions, for example. However, Kaizen is not usually an important 
topic, as there is a separate, daily Kaizen meeting, which is attended 
mainly by specialists. From time to time, team members of ‘affected 
teams’ may attend these meetings, but this does not happen often, 
probably once a year.  
This – that Kaizen is not usually an important topic – may explain 
the fact that team members make less than two improvement sug-
gestion on average per annum, despite the team’s responsibility for 
Kaizen. 
 
 
                                                 
12   i.e. everyone performs all of the team’s jobs subsequently, not just some 
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The Team Leaders 
Management appoints team leaders. Eighty per cent of team leaders 
are former foremen who were ‘transformed’ to team leaders in 1992, 
when teamwork was introduced (Murakami 1995a: 97, Murakami 
1998: 800ff).  
Murakami (ibid.) predicted that team leaders’ responsibilities would 
be expanded into those of a traditional supervisor, resulting in team 
leaders and supervisors sharing management responsibilities. How-
ever, unions ensured that this has not happened. The deputy conve-
nor for the TGWU at the Luton plant reported that there were some 
team leaders who actually tried to take over the role of a foreman or 
supervisor, but ‘we (the unions, N.W.) made sure that didn’t hap-
pen’ (interview notes). 
Team leaders must be able to perform all operations within the 
team’s area, as they cover for absentees. They plan and organise job 
rotation, ensure material supply, monitor if team members meet 
their responsibilities
14, take a leading role in cost-reduction activi-
ties within the team, and train team members. They also regulate in-
ternal matters and disputes. 
Despite the range of functions they perform, team leaders are re-
sponsible only for minor decisions, such as how to rotate jobs and 
which tools to use. Supervisors or managers make all bigger deci-
sions. Team leaders have no disciplinary functions, either. These are 
performed by supervisors, who are responsible for around four 
teams and perform all personnel issues (Vauxhall 1994).  
Since team leaders are appointed, ‘many workers seem to view 
them as a new form of supervision rather than integral part of their 
teams’ (Murakami 1998: 804f). 
 
5.   Comparison 
In this section, teamwork in the four studied plants is compared.  
                                                 
14   Here, team leaders do take over supervisory functions, even though they do 
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The first part deals with production technology, while the following 
parts deal with organisational aspects – horizontal and vertical inte-
gration of tasks, the role of the team-leaders, and the degree of self-
regulation. 
 
5.1 Production  Technology 
Teams in all four plants work on a rather short-cycled assembly line 
with cycle times below two minutes. In this respect, all plants are 
identical. However, there is one important difference concerning 
production technology: Eisenach, Luton and Sunderland are final 
assembly plants. In the units where the large majority of employees 
works, trim and final assembly, work is almost purely manual
15. 
The Mercedes plant, on the other hand, is an engine plant that is 
highly mechanised
16. The conditions for job enrichment are more 
favourable in areas of mechanised production than in areas of man-
ual work, as there are more indirect tasks to be performed in 
mechanised areas, such as maintenance
17   and machine set-up 
(Kuhlmann 1996, Schumann/Gerst 1996). 
Another important technological difference between A-City and the 
three other plants is the low level of buffers in Sunderland, Luton 
and Eisenach. In A-City, there are comparatively many buffers, 
which allow for a de-coupling of the production flow.  
As the production technology, or ‘technological framework’ at Eis-
enach, Luton and Sunderland is basically the same
18, there are no 
technological reasons for different forms of working organisation in 
general and different models of teamwork in particular in these 
plants. 
                                                 
15   The preceding units (press, body, paint) are highly automated, and thus only 
few people work in these areas. 
16   The plant is mechanised, but not automated, i.e. there are many machines in 
A-City, but no robots. 
17   There are maintenance tasks to be performed in areas of manual work, too, 
but as there are far fewer machines in areas of manual work than in automated 
ones, there are far less maintenance tasks to be performed. 
18   There are many minor differences in the production technology between these 
three plants, but these differences don’t have a significant impact on the work-
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As the assembly line with short cycle times remains central to all 
four plants, technological dependence (i.e. workers’ dependence on 
the assembly line) is rather pronounced  (which is even increased by 
the low level of buffers in Sunderland, Luton and Eisenach), which 
restricts the scope for (teams’) self regulation, regardless of whether 
independent decisions by teams are permitted. Thus, this techno-
logical framework does not provide good conditions for the imple-
mentation of innovative, self-organised teamwork such as in the 
Volvo factories Kalmar and Uddevalla
19, and thus the empowerment 
of employees. 
After dealing with production technology, I will now turn to organ-
isational aspects. 
 
5.2 Job  Enlargement 
In A-City, Eisenach and Luton, workers master all jobs from their 
team’s section, and teams rotate regularly and completely (i.e. 
through all jobs). In Sunderland, on the other hand, each worker is 
requested to master only three jobs (and in practice, they do not 
normally master more than that), so that complete rotation cannot 
take place. Furthermore, while job rotation in the other plant takes 
place on a scheduled basis, this is not the case in Sunderland. Most 
team members stay at their workstation most of the time and change 
only it in order to cover for absentees. Therefore, a balancing of dif-
ferent motion routines does not take place. If jobs are rotated in 
Sunderland, this is prescribed by supervisors, while teams decide 
themselves on how to rotate in the other plants. 
 
5.3 Job  Enrichment 
The integration of indirect production and planning tasks and func-
tions in the team’s area of responsibility (also called ‘vertical inte-
gration’ of jobs or ‘job enrichment’) is most pronounced in A-City. 
This comprehensive integration improves co-operation within the 
                                                 
19  In the Kalmar and Uddevalla plants, there were no assembly lines (thus as-
sembly took place stationary), and cycle times were around two hours 
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team, brings about a reduction of hierarchy and a re-qualification of 
production work (Gerst et al. 1995), breaking with the taylorist 
principles that production workers should be only minimally quali-
fied and that planning and execution of tasks are to be carried out 
by different people.  
The case of Mercedes-Benz shows that ‘a consistent implementa-
tion of self-organisation has positive effects even under otherwise 
unchanged work structures’ (Gerst et al. 1999: 390). 
Job enrichment in the other plants is considerably less comprehen-
sive. Both teams in Luton and Sunderland have only few additional 
tasks besides their direct production tasks. As there are still dedi-
cated personnel for maintenance and quality assurance in both 
plants, team members are only responsible for minor maintenance 
and a short self-inspection of performed jobs. Furthermore, team 
members are expected to participate in Kaizen, the continuous im-
provement process. Other indirect production tasks or planning 
functions are not devolved to the teams. Thus, job enrichment for 
team members in Luton and Sunderland turns out to be very limited. 
Eisenach lies between those two poles (A-City on the one hand, Lu-
ton and Sunderland on the other), as team members are also respon-
sible for material supply, holiday scheduling and the selection of 
new members next to their responsibilities for quality assurance and 
Kaizen. 
Because of their responsibility for Kaizen and Quality, employees 
in Eisenach are ‘qualificatory challenged’ (Mickler et al. 1996: 118) 
and become integrated into decision processes, for which superiors 
and specialists were responsible exclusively before. This results in a 
reduction of hierarchy, according to Adler (1992) and a higher 
commitment of production workers. However, the permanently high 
level of performance is impeding for the maintenance of this com-
mitment, Mickler et al. (1996: 118) object. 
As in Eisenach, Kaizen and Quality are among the tasks of teams in 
Luton, however Kaizen seems to be less important than in Eisenach, 
as workers in Eisenach make about ten times more improvement 
suggestions than workers in Luton, and as Kaizen is no important Wergin: Teamwork in the Automobile Industry 175 
topic in team meetings in Luton (20 compared to 2 suggestions per 
year, cf. above), which may be explained by the fact that there is a 
separate, daily Kaizen meeting in Luton. It is likely that team mem-
bers thus feel that there are specialists who do this job. Furthermore, 
one of employees’ main criticisms in Luton is that management 
does not listen to them and their ideas. 
The situation in Sunderland is similar: team members are responsi-
ble for Kaizen, but it has no high priority for them. Team meetings 
provide no possibility to discuss improvement suggestions, as there 
are no discussions in team meetings (cf. sec. 4.3). Furthermore, 
similar to the situation in Luton, workers get the feeling that their 
contributions are not appreciated (Garrahan/Stewart 1992: 102). 
In Eisenach, on the other hand, separate Kaizen meetings as in Lu-
ton do not exist, and thus it is a more important topic in the team 
meetings. Furthermore, there are ‘Kaizen garages’ close to the line 
where workers can test improvement suggestions independently
20. 
The existence of these ‘Kaizen garages’ shows workers that man-
agement does appreciate workers’ ideas.  
In Luton, such garages do not exist, thus workers cannot test their 
ideas if it is not possible to test them directly on-line, which is obvi-
ously not always possible
21. Thus, the ‘qualificatory challenge’ for 
workers, which Mickler et al. (1996) found in Eisenach, is not pre-
sent in Luton. In Sunderland, testing of ideas is not possible, as 
even slight deviations from the standard operations procedures are 
forbidden.  
 
5.4  Role of Team Leaders 
While at both GM plants management controls teams through ap-
pointed team leaders, team speakers at Mercedes’ A-City plant are 
elected by workers, and can also be elected out of office. This 
                                                 
20   Workers have got up to 52 minutes daily at their disposal to test improvement 
suggestions (or, for example, to discuss them with fellow members of the 
team) in the overlapping period of two shifts. 
21   Testing on-line is confined to small changes in the standard operations proce-
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makes it rather likely that they will stand up for their team members 
and defend them against superiors. The team speaker in A-City is a 
moderator, spokesman and person to turn to for management (Gerst 
et al. 1999: 374), but definitely not a superior, while team leaders in 
Luton and Eisenach are quasi-superiors. 
Furthermore, as team speakers at Mercedes are not appointed by 
management, they are less exposed to management control than 
team leaders in the other plants and pay much attention to the views 
of their team members (Gerst et al. 1995), in opposition to team 
leaders at other plants
22. 
While team leaders at the GM plants perform many tasks, most im-
portantly the co-ordination and allocation of work and the monitor-
ing of team members, team leaders and speakers at A-City and Sun-
derland have only few additional tasks (compared with normal team 
members), which is stressed by the fact that they work regularly on-
line, while team leaders at Eisenach and Luton only work on-line to 
cover for absentees. Team leaders in Sunderland have a weak role, 
as the supervisor is responsible for almost everything. The team 
speaker in A-City has got a stronger role, despite his few tasks, as 
he is elected which gives him a high degree of legitimacy among his 
fellow team members. 
While teamwork in A-City is team (member) centred, in Luton and 
Eisenach it is leader centred, i.e. the area of (team-) leadership re-
sponsibility is considerably larger that that of team (member) re-
sponsibilities. Teams in Sunderland are neither, as neither team 
members, nor leaders have any scope to make independent deci-
sions. All decisions (besides those concerning training) are made by 
the supervisor, i.e. by someone who does not belong to the team. 
 
5.5  Degree of Self-regulation 
From the previous discussion, it follows that teams at Mercedes are 
far more autonomous and self regulated than teams in the other 
                                                 
22  For Vauxhall, cf. Murakami (1995b); for Opel, cf. Opel (1996) and (1999b); 
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plants. In the GM and Nissan plants, superiors retained far more re-
sponsibilities than in A-City.  
At Mercedes, workers have comprehensive freedom for the design 
and organisation of their work process. Mercedes’ management is 
convinced that this is the best way to free workers’ creativity and 
achieve their commitment, which is submerged in traditional, ford-
ist assembly line production. These changes are also welcomed by a 
great majority of employees. 
In Eisenach, teams with their strong team leaders have a consider-
able scope for self-regulation concerning work scheduling and the 
deployment of personnel, however they always have to consider 
strict production targets and the (intended) scarcity of personnel, 
which both restrict them.  
In Luton, teams have less scope for self-regulation than teams in 
Eisenach, as teams and their leaders are not responsible for person-
nel functions as in Eisenach, and they cannot refuse production tar-
gets, as teams in Eisenach theoretically can. The same limitations 
apply. Thus, besides job rotation, ‘decision making is not in the 
hand of the group’ (interview notes) in Luton. 
Workers in Sunderland contribute to flexibility and productivity, 
but teams are not self-organised whatsoever. Internal relations are 
still very hierarchical, as the supervisor is basically responsible for 
everything (Wickens 1985, Wickens 1987), with the result that 
teams (including their leaders) have hardly any responsibilities be-
sides their direct production tasks. Teamwork and the organisation 
of work at Sunderland in general have nothing to do with empower-
ing workers on the shop-floor (cf. Garrahan/Stewart 1992).  
6. Discussion 
Teamwork in the four studied plants differs widely. Teamwork at 
A-City comes close to the ideal of innovative teamwork, while 
teamwork at Sunderland pretty much represents the structural con-
servative prototype. Teamwork in none of the four plants could jus-
tifiably be called post-fordist, but teamwork at Mercedes comes 
much closer to it than teamwork at Nissan.  178  European Political Economy Review  
 
 
As the models of teamwork in the four plants differ considerably, so 
do the potential consequences (of the introduction of teamwork) on 
employees. Teamwork can lead to an empowerment of employees, 
or to an intensification of work and management control. It has the 
potential for both, and thus claims that teamwork invariably leads to 
one of the two cannot be taken seriously. 
Which form of teamwork is introduced in a plant depends on a 
number of factors, local as well as national ones. Important factors 
are the ‘management style’, union attitudes to teamwork, and the re-
lationship between management and unions.  
Given the strength of unions in the motor industry, the options cho-
sen by unions can be a significant factor in influencing management 
strategy. Therefore, the model for change, and with it, the model of 
teamwork, in an unionised plant needs to incorporate particular un-
ion responses to company policies (Carr 1994: 207).  
This is why the implementation of teamwork at Sunderland and Lu-
ton proceeded in rather different ways, and this, in turn, is one cen-
tral reason why the realised models are rather different. Nissan was 
able to start from scratch, establishing a new factory on a greenfield 
site, with no traditions of trade unions organisation or established 
shop-floor custom and practice in an environment of high unem-
ployment and no tradition of trade union militancy. This, together 
with the stress on careful selection of a loyal workforce allowed 
Nissan to impose a model of its choice unilaterally. The conclusion 
of a de-facto strike-free ‘sweetheart deal’ with a co-operative un-
ion
23, which was possible for the same circumstances, together with 
the careful selection of workers, furthermore reduced the danger of 
shop-floor resistance in the future (cf. Holloway 1987, 
Oliver/Wilkinson 1992). 
                                                 
23   According to Holloway (1987: 147ff), this deal was only possible after the de-
struction of ‘old traditions’ and a considerable weakening of unions in the mo-
tor industry, which Holloway ascribes to changes in the management style at 
British Leyland/Rover at the time when Ryder and Edwardes were CEOs. 
Holloway (ibid.) postulates that the crushing of unions under Edwardes had an 
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Vauxhall management, on the other hand, had to cope with strong, 
established unions which (in particular the TGWU) were critical 
about new, ‘lean’ working practices. Thus, in order to prevent dam-
aging confrontations with employees and unions, Vauxhall chose to 
make some concessions to unions regarding their future role in the 
plant. As a result, unions could secure many of their old positions. 
The shop steward continues to be the key actor in the workplace, 
albeit in an altered state (cf. Carr 1994, Stewart 1997, Murakami 
1998). 
The differences between A-City and Eisenach concerning the im-
plementation of teamwork are similar to those between Sunderland 
and Luton: The Mercedes plant is a brownfield plant with a strong 
works council. Whether or not to consult the works council was no 
question, as the works constitution act gives works council the right 
to co-determination in such questions.  
Eisenach, on the other hand, is a newly set-up plant on a greenfield 
site, thus there was no works council which had to be consulted, and 
thus the model of teamwork was imposed unilaterally by manage-
ment. Therefore, the model of teamwork realised in Eisenach is 
very much about rationalisation. 
To conclude: In A-city and in Luton, teamwork was introduced into 
plants where traditions of industrial relations already existed. There-
fore, management had to seek agreements with union representa-
tives (in the case of Luton) and the works council (in the case of A-
City)
24, respectively. This is for different reasons: In Germany, 
there is a legal requirement to do this, and in Britain, management 
had to recognise existing union power
25. 
Another important factor for differences between different models 
of teamwork is that self-organised, innovative teamwork, in which 
team members assume responsibility for most indirect production 
and planning tasks, rests on one characteristic which is a constitu-
                                                 
24   However, works council members are de facto union representatives, too, as 
IG Metall always wins large majorities in the works council elections in car 
factories. Thus, most works councillors are also IG Metall members. 
25   Which is not to say that unions in German automobile plants are not powerful, 
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tive element of the German production system: skilled labour. 
However, the fact that the German production system possesses the 
preconditions for innovative teamwork does not necessarily mean 
that this concept of teamwork has always been realised in German 
plants. Skilled labour is a necessary condition, but not a sufficient 
one, as the case of Opel Eisenach demonstrates.  
Furthermore, it has been mentioned that the conditions for the in-
troduction of more innovative concepts of teamwork are more fa-
vourable in areas of automated production, as in the Mercedes plant, 
than in areas of manual work. 
 
6.1  Bi-polarity of Different Models of Teamwork? 
After the description and comparison of the four cases, I shall now 
come back to my two research questions. The first question was 
whether teamwork in different car factories can be depicted using a 
bi-polar model of teamwork, as conceptualised by various authors. 
The comparison in the previous section shows that teamwork in 
Mercedes’ A-City plant is almost the opposite of teamwork prac-
tised in Nissan’s Sunderland plant. The model of teamwork that has 
been realised in A-City centres around the creation of skilled, com-
prehensive job designs and an extension of self-organisation on the 
shop floor. These concepts come very close to the ideal type of in-
novative teamwork as defined above, despite the continuing exis-
tence of the assembly line. The important fact is that employees in 
A-City are, indeed, empowered. 
Teamwork practised in Sunderland, on the other hand, can clearly 
be assigned to the structural conservative model of teamwork. Here, 
the possibilities for workers to influence production do not increase, 
teams are not self-organised, and job enrichment and enlargement 
are very limited.   
Thus, these two models of teamwork fit the categories of the bi-
polar model of teamwork as described above. However, a compari-
son between Sunderland on the one hand, and Luton and Eisenach 
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production is not necessarily identical. While the organisation of 
work in all three plants follows the same example, the outcomes are 
different. Teamwork in Sunderland, Luton and Eisenach represents 
different approaches to ‘Japan-oriented’ teamwork, which, while 
having many similarities (cf. above), differ significantly with re-
spect to the position of the team and their leader in the internal hier-
archy, as well as regarding employees’ integration into optimising 
activities (Kaizen).  
The first point – the position of teams and their leaders in the inter-
nal hierarchy – sets Eisenach with it s strong teams and leaders 
apart from Sunderland, where teams and their leaders have got a 
very weak position, with Luton lying somewhere in between. The 
second point – employees’ role in Kaizen – sets Eisenach apart 
from Luton and Sunderland, as Kaizen is de facto less important in 
the latter two plants. Thus, the cases of Luton and, particularly, Eis-
enach demonstrate that increased participation and self-organisation 
on the shop floor are not incompatible with ‘lean production’. 
This means that teamwork based on the concepts of lean production 
cannot be equated with structural conservative teamwork a priori, as 
the case of Sunderland may suggest. Teamwork in Eisenach rather 
represents an intermediate position between the two ideal types ‘in-
novative’ and ‘structural conservative’ teamwork. Adler (1995) 
suggests the term ‘democratic Taylorism’ for this third model
26. 
The teamwork model that has been implemented in Luton, in turn, 
lies between ‘structural conservative teamwork’ and ‘democratic 
Taylorism’
27.  
The bi-polar model of teamwork was useful some years ago, when 
almost all forms of teamwork realised in the automotive industry 
                                                 
26  With this term, Adler (1995) relates to NUMMI, not to Eisenach. However, 
Eisenach is strikingly similar to NUMMI, as NUMMI acted as role model for 
Eisenach. For reasons of space, this model named ‘democratic Taylorism’ will 
not be described here, but as stated, it is strikingly similar to the model real-
ised in Eisenach. For details, cf. Adler (1992) and (1995). 
27  I will not elaborate where exactly between these two poles Luton and Eisen-
ach are located, as this is not necessary for my purpose, that is to show that a 
bi-polar categorisation of teamwork does not depict the reality of teamwork in 
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did indeed correspond to either of the two prototypes (innovative or 
structural conservative), as teamwork was oriented either on ‘Vol-
voism’ (i.e. socio-technical, ‘innovative’ teamwork) or ‘Toyotism’ 
(i.e. ‘structural conservative’ teamwork in Japanese plants). There 
was no middle ground. 
Today, this bi-polar model of teamwork does not depict reality ade-
quately any more. Newer models of teamwork such as in Luton and 
Eisenach are, while being based on the principles of lean production 
in a general sense, not modelled on any specific Japanese plant
28, 
but rather on the US-American transplants such as NUMMI, CAMI 
and Saturn, which are joint-ventures between US-American and 
Japanese companies. While the former (the Japanese-owned plants) 
do fit the prototype of structural conservative teamwork, the latter 
(the American-based transplants) don’t. The latter rather represent 
an intermediate type. 
Thus, this research suggests that the emergence the so-called trans-
plants, and of forms of teamwork modelled on it (such as in Eisen-
ach and Luton) blurs the previously clear-cut bi-polar model of 
teamwork in the automotive industry. 
 
6.2 Neo-  or  Post-Fordism? 
The second question was whether current models of teamwork sig-
nify a development towards post-fordism, or whether they are 
merely part of a neo-fordist approach to rationalisation. 
The case studies presented here suggest that it is premature to speak 
of the end of Fordism. Teamwork based on the principled of lean 
production is different from traditional taylorist forms of production, 
but it is definitely not post-fordist. While some rigidities of Taylor-
ism are defused, the assembly line is still present in all four facto-
ries, cycle times are still short
29, and line-dependence is even in-
creased by the reduction of buffers in three of the plants. This 
model of teamwork is essentially a means of rationalisation that 
                                                 
28   meaning a factory owned by a Japanese company, and not necessarily based 
in Japan 
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obeys the laws of Taylorism, and does not question the assembly 
line. Thus, this form of teamwork is neo-fordist rather than post-
fordist. 
I shall now go into each of the four cases briefly. In order to illus-
trate why the four cases cannot be called post-fordist, I apply a 
model developed by Berggren (1992). This model integrates differ-
ent indicators for Fordism into two dimensions, working organisa-
tion, (measured in ‘independence’ of the team) and production 
technology. 
As stated earlier, the assembly line with short cycle times remains 
central to all four plants. There are not even attempts to modify the 
assembly line via a de-coupling of workstations or similar measures. 
Thus, in this dimension, all four plants remain on the same level, on 
the initial position (traditional assembly line). While on could object 
that the presence of Andon-Systems in all plants beside A-City is an 
important modification of the assembly line, as it gives every 
worker the possibility to stop the line, the reduction of buffers in the 
same plants works in the other direction. 
Thus, it remains to compare the organisation of work in the four 
plants. As I have done this in the previous section already, this shall 
be done briefly here.  
The organisation of work in Nissan’s Sunderland plant has not tran-
scended Fordism. At best, it has supplemented classical Taylorist 
mechanisms of control with newer and subtler means of social con-
trol (Garrahan/Stewart 1992), above all peer control. From the 
workers’ point of view, there are no considerable differences be-
tween a plant with a traditional working organisation and the Nissan 
plant, apart from the fact that they work even harder (interview 
notes). 
The degree of workers’ self-regulation goes furthest at Mercedes A-
City. The case of Mercedes demonstrates that, even under unfa-
vourable, restrictive technological conditions such as line produc-
tion, it is possible to transform Taylorist forms of work into self-
organised teamwork that allows greater employees’ participation 
(Schumann/Gerst 1996: 41). 184  European Political Economy Review  
 
 
Luton and Eisenach lie between these two poles on the ‘working 
organisation axis’, whereby the degree of self-regulation is some-
what larger in Eisenach. 
 
Figure 3: a two-dimensional classification of the examined cases  
 
                 Independence       
 
 integrated, 
qualified  
teamwork 
 4  •  A-City 
    
 
strong team 
organisation  3 
    
 
weak team 
organisation  2 
• 
 
• 
 
• 
 
 
 
Eisenach 
 
Luton 
 
Sunderland 
 
    
 
traditional 
organisation 
of work 
 1 
    
        
        
      1   2  3    4 
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
 
d
e
s
i
g
n
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     assembly 
line 
modified 
assembly 
line 
parallel  flow 
systems, var. 
cycle times 
complete 
assembly 
 
          
 
Source: Berggren 1992: 105 (classification of cases by the author) 
 
 
Classifying the four cases in the pattern developed by Berggren il-
lustrates why none of the studied cases can be called post-fordist: 
While the introduction of teamwork in the four plants dissociates 
work from Fordism in one dimension to varying degrees (not a t all 
in the case of Sunderland though), it doesn’t in the second dimen-
sion of production technology (cf. figure 3) – teams still work on 
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rather traditional assembly lines, not in stationary ‘assembly is-
lands’
30. 
These forms of teamwork move production away from the tradi-
tional taylorist working organisation, but they do not transcend Tay-
lorism altogether. While working organisation hardly changes at all 
at Nissan, the changes at the GM plants are considerable, but they 
remain within the framework of Fordism rather than transcending it, 
thus they are neo-fordist rather than post-fordist. The changes in the 
working organisation are most pronounced at Mercedes, where 
elements of post-fordist forms of production can be discovered, 
such as the softening the clear taylorist distinction between instruc-
tion and execution.  
Yet, as mentioned before, these changes take place only in one di-
mension, namely working organisation (y-axis in fig. 3), while there 
are no considerable changes in the area of production technology 
(x-axis). Thus, none of the four models of teamwork transcends 
fordism altogether. They are neo-fordist rather than post-fordist. 
 
7. Conclusion 
The general question behind this article (and behind the two more 
specific research questions) is: Which impact does teamwork have 
on employees? This article has shown that there are different forms 
of teamwork, ranging from ‘structural conservative’ teamwork to 
‘innovative teamwork’
31. While the bi-polar conceptual framework 
of teamwork does not depict reality adequately (any more), it is true 
that models of teamwork realised in different plants do differ con-
siderably indeed. Thus, the impact of teamwork on employees can-
not be judged a priori. An examination of the individual case is nec-
essary. Only this can tell whether teamwork brings about an en-
hancement of working conditions, and possibly an empowerment, 
or whether it means an intensification of work and control. Team-
work has the potential for both.  
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The more employees and unions are involved in the implementation 
process, the more likely it is that an innovative type of teamwork 
will be introduced. The important fact is that there are win-win 
situations. There are examples of teamwork that have improved 
employees’ job satisfaction and productivity at the same time. Even 
if the introduction of teamwork leads to an intensification of work, 
workers’ job satisfaction might increase nevertheless if this is com-
pensated for by greater levels of skill and increased autonomy. Mer-
cedes A-City an example for this.  
Yet, while changes in the organisation of work implicated by the in-
troduction of teamwork are considerable, the examples studied here 
suggest that these changes remain firmly within the fordist produc-
tion model. Cases like Uddevalla and Kalmar, where the taylorist 
division of labour is transcended, seem to be
32 exceptions. Thus, 
judging from the cases presented here, it seems premature, to say 
the least, to announce the imminent death of fordism. 
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